Including Security Monitoring in Cloud Service Level Agreements by Wonjiga, Amir Teshome et al.
Including Security Monitoring in Cloud Service Level
Agreements
Amir Teshome, Louis Rilling, Christine Morin
To cite this version:
Amir Teshome, Louis Rilling, Christine Morin. Including Security Monitoring in Cloud Service
Level Agreements. Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS), PhD forum , Sep
2016, Budapest, Hungary. <hal-01354975>
HAL Id: hal-01354975
https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01354975
Submitted on 21 Aug 2016
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Including Security Monitoring in Cloud Service Level Agreements
Amir Teshome
Email: amir-teshome.wonjiga@inria.fr
Inria, IRISA
Louis Rilling
Email: louis.rilling@irisa.fr
DGA
Christine Morin
Email: christine.morin@inria.fr
Inria, IRISA
1. Introduction
One of the risks of moving to a public cloud is losing
full control of the information system infrastructure. The
service provider will be in charge of monitoring the physical
infrastructure and providing the required service to clients.
This pushes clients to have trust on providers. Service
providers give assurance on some aspects of the service
but, as of today, security monitoring is not one of them. In
our work, we aim to allow providers to provide customers
with guarantees on security monitoring of their outsourced
information system.
We focus our work on security monitoring in clouds.
Security Monitoring is the collection, analysis, and escala-
tion of indications and warnings to detect and respond to
intrusions. By monitoring a system it is possible to detect
suspicious behaviors and take action before severe damage.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and logs from firewalls
are often used for this purpose.
A Service Level Agreement (SLA) is a contract between
clients and service providers. SLAs describe the provided
service, the rights and obligations of both parties and state
penalties for when the specified terms are not respected.
Hence, SLAs help providers to build more trust.
To include security monitoring terms into an
SLA the following tasks are required, (i) a way for
providers/clients to specify their security monitoring
parameters/requirements, (ii) mechanisms to enforce these
requirements in a cloud infrastructure and (iii) a verification
method to check if the requirements are respected at any
given time.
In the rest of this paper, Section 2 presents related work,
Section 3 describes challenges to be addressed, Section 4
presents our approach, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Related works
There exists some works on both creating security mon-
itoring devices for a cloud [6] and defining languages and
frameworks for SLA description [3]. The domain specific
language proposed in [6] describes the detection algorithms
of the IDS rather than Service-Level Objectives (SLO), for
example a set of rules that can be negotiated before figuring
in an SLA. In other words, the language is too low-level to
describe SLOs.
To our knowledge, there have been no attempts to in-
clude security monitoring terms in SLAs. The difficulty is
that SLA terms related to security monitoring devices need
to be verifiable in the cloud setup.
Regarding IDS verification metrics, Stefan Axelsson [1]
and Gu et al [2] presented a theoretical approach to measure
IDSs and showed that metrics that don’t include base rates
(defined as the ratio between the number of attack network
packets and the total number of network packets) do not
truly describe the ability of an IDS to be practically usable.
This problem is known as the Base-Rate Fallacy [1]. The
latter one proposed a single unified metrics called Intrusion
Detection Capability (CID).
To verify an IDS, Probst et al. [5] describe a method in
two phases: an analysis of network access control followed
by the IDS evaluation based on the set of services running
in the virtual infrastructure. Before this work, Massicotte
et al. [4] used a virtual infrastructure to generate traffic
traces and used the traces to evaluate IDSs in traditional
servers (non-cloud environment). Both approaches measure
the efficiency of an IDS, the former in a given virtualized
infrastructure and the latter as a generic product, but neither
of them take the base rate into account.
3. Challenges
Including security monitoring terms in SLAs raises a
number of technical challenges, which include:
1) The malleability of virtualized infrastructures: by
its nature the cloud is very dynamic. Creation,
deletion and migration of VMs is frequent. Security
monitoring terms must anticipate such changes.
2) There is no standard to express precise security
monitoring properties independently from the ac-
tual devices used.
3) To our knowledge, there is no method to automati-
cally configure a set of security monitoring devices
according to an abstract policy.
4) There is a lack of method to evaluate security
monitoring setups specifically in clouds.
In this paper we present preliminary work to address two
of the challenges (the first and the last ones). The remaining
ones are left as a future work.
4. Proposed Approach
A design requirement is to make the security monitoring
process - definition, enforcement and verification of SLA
terms - automatic. Indeed, manual management of security
properties in a cloud is tedious and error prone.
The baseline of our approach is first to find verification
mechanisms for security monitoring setups. This will give
insights in the expected efficiency of different strategies to
setup security monitoring. From these insights, we should
be able to propose heuristics for automatically computing
security monitoring setups out of SLA terms.
Our first study focuses on IDSs. First, we found measur-
able parameters for a network IDS, and verification mecha-
nisms for these parameters. Intrusion Detection Capability
is a single unified metric, which aggregates a base rate in
its formula in addition to other traditionally used parameters
like detection and precision rate. Since the exact value of
the base rate can’t be known in a production environment,
we used a range of statistically proposed values.
4.1. Intrusion Detection Capability (CID)
CID is a metric used to evaluate IDSs, which was
introduced by Gu et al [2]. Let ‘x’ be the random variable
representing the IDS input packets where it can be either
an attack or a legitimate packet and ‘y’ representing the
IDS output where it can be detected as an intrusive or
non-intrusive packet by the IDS.
Note: base rate (B) is p(x=‘is an attack packet’)
• Let H(x) indicates the entropy of x as defined in
information theory and
• The mutual information I(x;y) which measures the
amount of information shared between the two ran-
dom variables, then
• Intrusion Detection Capability (CID) can be defined
as:
CID =
I(x;y)
H(x)
Its value ranges in [0,1] and a higher value indicates a
better IDS ability in accurately classifying the input packets.
4.2. Verification Mechanism
The verification mechanism runs attacks against a given
configuration but without damaging the production envi-
ronment. An example of the attack running environment is
shown in Figure 1.
In a given infrastructure we add a target VM (shown in a
green box) after an IDS to be verified. This VM exhibits the
behavior of the other VMs monitored by the verified IDS.
Multiple target VMs could also be added in a case where
a single VM is unable to exhibit all the required behaviors.
An attacker machine (virtual or physical) is also added. This
machine could be located inside or outside the cloud. The
attacker runs a set of representative attacks and the virtual
switch switch
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Figure 1. Attack Running Environment
switch is configured to redirect all the attack packets towards
the target VM. Since the attack running mechanism uses the
production infrastructure network resources, we must take
care that the attacks have a reasonably low impact on those
resources.
The rate of the occurrence of attack packets is deter-
mined by a given base rate. In this process all the outgoing
packets from the attacker and the output of the IDS are
logged. Using information from the attack packets we can
differentiate true positives from false positives in the output
of IDS. Using these values and the injected base rate we
calculate the CID.
5. Conclusion and Future Work
In our work we chose the CID as a usable metric to
describe the efficiency of an IDS because it takes the base
rate into account. We also presented an evaluation method to
measure CID of an IDS dynamically using attack injection.
The attack packets are redirected in order not to damage
the production VMs. But there is a trade-off between the
evaluation methodology and the performance of the produc-
tion infrastructure. A care should be taken since the evalua-
tion process uses the production network infrastructure (not
a cloned or simulated one). In particular it needs caution for
not creating unacceptable traffic load.
As future work we plan to extend this work to other
monitoring probes (e.g firewalls). CID is used to describe
efficiency of IDSs, other aspects of IDS could also be
included into SLAs. Definition and enforcement of SLAs
are also part of future work.
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